

The stakes in Berlin are very high. If we accede to Soviet demands there—and we were prepared to do so in part last year until the West Germans leaked our plans to the press—then we stand to lose West Germany. If this occurs, NATO would be disbanded, and Western Europe would be ripe for neutralization and subsequent communization.

The United States must seize the initiative in Berlin while Mr. Khrushchev has given us the moratorium to settle our election problems. We could start by making some demands of our own. First, we could demand that the people in East Germany be given free elections, as they were originally promised. Next, we could demand that the wall be removed. Next, we could demand that Korea, Vietnam, and Germany be reunited through free elections. Next, we could demand that the Soviets get out of Cuba, in accord with the Monroe Doctrine. If Mr. Khrushchev refuses, then why couldn't he to at least trade with us on a quid pro quo basis, rather than permitting all the trading to be against our interests. I do not advocate any deals with the Communists, because they have proved they will honor their commitments only so long as they are in their own interests. But, since our State Department insists on negotiations, we ought to have some demands of our own to make.

If we act with determination, and proceed without delay in making demands and taking actions on Cuba, we can create a crisis that will put Mr. Khrushchev on the griddle while Berlin simmers on the back burner. After all, he knows which side has superior military power. Why not convince him we have the will to use that power?

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I firmly believe that this resolution expresses the opinion of the average American citizen. It has become a truism to state that the conduct of foreign policy resides in the executive branch of our Government. I know of no one who would take issue with this statement. However, upon a more careful evaluation of this constitutional responsibility, one realizes that the executive branch is charged only with the implementation and conduct of foreign policy. The power to formulate foreign policy still resides in the electorate—the people of the United States. The best way that the people of the United States have for making their will and their firm resolve known to the President and to the State Department is through their most closely responsible elected officials, those of us in the Congress. This resolution which expresses the will of the people of the United States is no more and no less than a directive from the people to the executive branch of the Government specifying the framework within which our foreign policy on Berlin must be conducted.

It must be noted that this resolution is not self-executing. Commendable as it may be, unless it is honored by our President and the State Department there is no particular virtue in the Congress giving its unanimous approval to it.

Not only do I urge its speedy approval, but I implore those officials charged with the implementation of the policy which it expresses to take heed and honor it as a solemn obligation owed to the people of the United States.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, Senate Concurrent Resolution 97 is indefinitely postponed.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed in the RECORD the full text of the concurrent resolution and portions of the report on the concurrent resolution.

Mr. SPARKMAN. The report of the Foreign Relations Committee is very brief, and it should appear in the RECORD. I ask unanimous consent that it also be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the concurrent resolution and the report (No. 2288) were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

#### HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 570

Whereas the primary purpose of the United States in its relations with all other nations is and has been to develop and sustain a just and enduring peace for all; and

Whereas it is the purpose of the United States to encourage and support the establishment of a free, unified, and democratic Germany; and

Whereas in connection with the termination of hostilities in World War II of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union freely entered into binding agreements under which the four powers have the right to remain in Berlin, with the right of ingress and egress, until the conclusion of a final settlement with the Government of Germany; and

Whereas no such final settlement has been concluded by the four powers and the aforementioned agreements continue in force: Now, therefore, be it

*Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress—*

(a) that the continued exercise of United States, British, and French rights in Berlin constitutes a fundamental political and moral determination;

(b) that the United States would regard as intolerable any violation by the Soviet Union directly or through others of those rights in Berlin, including the right of ingress and egress;

(c) that the United States is determined to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, any violation of those rights by the Soviet Union directly or through others, and to fulfill our commitment to the people of Berlin with respect to their resolve for freedom.

#### SENATE REPORT NO. 2288

The Committee on Foreign Relations having had under consideration Senate Concurrent Resolution 97, expressing the sense of the Congress with respect to the situation in Berlin, reports the resolution favorably, with an amendment, and recommends that the resolution as amended be passed.

Senate Concurrent Resolution 97 was introduced on October 3, 1962, by Mr. JAVRS for himself and Mr. MOSS. On October 5, 1962, the House of Representatives passed House Concurrent Resolution 570, which was identical to Senate Concurrent Resolution 97 with the exception of one word. The Senate resolution had expressed the sense of Congress that the continued exercise of United States, British, and French rights in Berlin constitutes a fundamental political and moral purpose. The House substituted for the word "purpose" the word "determination".

On October 10, the Committee on Foreign Relations met in executive session and gave consideration to the two resolutions pending before it. Without objection it was agreed to amend Senate Concurrent Resolution 97 to conform to the resolution passed by the House of Representatives and to report Senate Concurrent Resolution 97, as thus amended, to the Senate.

The committee believes that the resolution clearly and succinctly states the determination of the Congress and of the American people with respect to the determination of the United States to fulfill our commitments with respect to the freedom of the people of Berlin. This commitment is expressed in paragraph (c) in these words: "That the United States is determined to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, any violation of those rights by the Soviet Union directly or through others, and to fulfill our commitment to the people of Berlin with respect to their resolve for freedom."

The committee recommends early and unanimous approval of this resolution by the Senate.

#### THE SITUATION IN CUBA

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I find both encouragement and disappointment in the announcement that the administration has decided to take unilateral steps to prevent transportation of supplies to Cuba in ships owned by nations who are our allies or profess neutrality. That we were forced to go it alone after making what I understand were strong representations to our allies is a bitter pill to swallow. That we have moved so promptly, although clearly not as far as we might have, encourages those of us who sincerely believe that stronger and more positive action was required.

We have taken a step, a good first step, but there is much yet to be done and there should be other steps, bigger ones. Surely we must have a showdown in the Caribbean and we must prepare for that day.

For one thing, Russia will be forced to increase the number of its own ships that will ply back and forth, to and from Cuba. The planned construction of a fishing port in Cuba by the Soviets shows their design to move into the Western Hemisphere for keeps. So while we have taken a good first step it can only be the start of more drastic, far-reaching action if we are successfully to thwart the Soviets in their move into the Western Hemisphere. In recent weeks, there have been a variety of proposals to meet the threat presented by Cuba, and the intervention of the Soviets. In spite of widely divergent proposals, all informed persons recognize the potential peril in the growing military buildup in Cuba with Russian assistance.

It appears inevitable that sooner or later we will find ourselves in a position which demands action for the protection of our own national security and for the protection of our friendly neighbors. President Kennedy has made it clear that on the basis of the present conditions and circumstances we do not regard the Cuban situation as requiring an invasion. Nevertheless, Castro keeps shouting to the world that we are plotting an invasion.

So the Communist-supported Cuban military buildup grows and grows—Castro's military capability increases by leaps and bounds—and all the while Castro protests his fear of military attack and seeks to brand us as the aggressor.

The entire world knows that we are not the aggressor in this situation. We did not create this powder keg in the Caribbean area. However, the time has come when we should and must act in self-protection and in the defense of our own national security. The threat to us may be more indirect than direct, but it is nevertheless real and imminent. How far must we retreat before invoking positive measures necessary for our own defense?

The answer is clear. The longer we wait, the greater becomes Castro's military power and potential for harm; and the greater the efforts we must exert in our own defense.

These conclusions respecting the Cuban peril crystallize the serious study I have given the question for many months. Even before November 1961, when I visited our naval base at Guantanamo, the real danger was becoming apparent. And, of course, since that time our fears and suspicions have been confirmed.

It is heartening to know that we have a wonderful group of top fighting men at Guantanamo, all of them imbued with great spirit, from their chief, Rear Adm. Edward H. O'Donnell, on down.

A year ago I visited Guantanamo and spent some time with Admiral O'Donnell. I was very favorably impressed with him as a naval officer as well as with his fine concept of the real peril now involved and the future peril.

As chairman of the Military Preparedness Subcommittee, I have done a great deal of work and have gained a great deal of information on the situation that cannot be brought out into the open. I do not know more about it than others, of course, and I do not know as much as many persons do, but I mention this to show that it was a long, painstaking study, and the very opposite of a hasty conclusion. It is my deliberate conclusion, after all hope has been exhausted, that nothing short of what I propose will do the work. Also, I am convinced that if we do not take more drastic steps, we shall increase the peril and get further into the woods.

I propose, Mr. President, that we create and define a defensive area or zone around Cuba which we consider vital to our own national security. And, further, that we give notice to all the world that, within this defensive zone or area, we are fully prepared to take whatever action necessary to protect our Nation and our Latin American allies from any further buildup of military strength and striking power which might endanger our security.

At the same time, we must demonstrate to and reassure the Cuban people that it is not they, but their Communist masters, who are the object of these preparations. Our humanitarian aid in the form of necessary food and medicine would and would nevertheless go through to the Cuban people.

This would be an act of defense, not an act of aggression. It would differ from the action we took in stationing our 7th Fleet in the Formosa Straits and in announcing to the world our intention to defend the islands of

Quemoy and Matsu. That action could not be characterized as other than a defensive measure on behalf of an ally and in our own interest—a defensive measure which unquestionably deterred any intent to invade which the Red Chinese might have entertained.

We have taken similar defensive steps in Lebanon in 1958, in Turkey, in Greece, in Western Europe, and elsewhere around the globe.

If we were right as to Formosa, Lebanon, and elsewhere, what then should stand in the way of adopting identical steps for our own protection in the Caribbean—our own backyard? Why should we fear any loud cries of "blockade," if we are taking appropriate steps for our own protection? A blockade is not a blockade when a nation acts prudently in its own interest and in self-defense, choosing not to wait until it is too late.

Day by day the peril grows as Khrushchev and Castro take step after step to pave the way for that Russian foothold. Recently, we were advised that the Soviets were undertaking the construction of a fishing port in Cuba in order to facilitate the commercial fishing operations of the Russian fleet in the Western Hemisphere. Coupled with this was the announcement that Cuba and Russia together are building 62 trawlers for Castro's use. We would be naive indeed to accept these announcements at face value and to conclude that peaceful uses alone are considered for the fishing port and the ships.

It took a long time in the history of affairs for it to be discovered that the area at Cuba was such a valuable fishing port for these faraway interests and countries.

One of the reasons recently assigned for the conclusion that Castro's military buildup was defensive was the fact that he had no ships with which to mount an invasion. Now we are told he is getting 62 ships. Trawlers can be used for fishing. They can also transport soldiers, and they can be mounted with guns. We might refer to these ships as Castro convertibles. And the fishing port provides a convenient submarine base in the Western Hemisphere.

The history of 20th century aggression is a long line of probing steps taken by an aggressor who felt his way—going as far as he could, ready at the same time to withdraw in the face of firm resistance. So it was with Mussolini in Ethiopia in 1935, with Hitler in the demilitarized Rhineland in 1936, with the Red Chinese in Formosa in 1950 and later, and with the Soviets in Berlin in 1948 and 1961. And so it is the same, I believe, in 1962, with Khrushchev seeking a foothold in the Western Hemisphere.

When the Berlin resolution was considered, I really expected that there would be some debate on it and some explanation. I was not prepared to debate it. I certainly did not intend to oppose it. However, it seems to me, relatively speaking, that our position is already well known as to Berlin. We have had troubles in Western Germany all through the years. We have troubles in Berlin now. We have repeatedly said—

and have acted to back up our statements—that they shall not pass, that we are not going to yield.

At the same time, Mr. President, it seems clear to me that with reference to Cuba, which can be a point of peril, such a short distance from our shoreline, it is absolutely necessary to take more positive steps and more firm action, somewhat along the line I have suggested. Otherwise, month after month and year after year this peril will become greater. It will grow in strength. It will grow in activity. It will become more and more difficult and burdensome for us to overcome.

My suggestion is only one suggestion. I believe every Member of the Senate who believes that some positive action is necessary should come forward and make a suggestion, after his thought has matured and a definite conclusion has been reached on the subject. This is my soul-searching conclusion, based upon at least a fair connection with and knowledge of the facts, from discussions not only with my fellow Senators, but also with many well-informed people who are in a position to know the facts, people who carry responsibility. Some of them have great military knowledge and experience.

I am speaking solely for myself on this subject.

The perimeter area around Cuba which we must defend for our own self protection and preservation is a matter for our military people to decide. Whatever this area be, we must take immediate steps to define its boundaries and announce our determination in clear and unmistakable terms.

Both our Western allies and our friends in this hemisphere will certainly understand the necessity of our action.

I am not versed in the field of diplomacy. I know nothing about diplomatic talk. However, logic, commonsense, and down-to-earth consideration of these matters, I repeat with emphasis, leads me to the conclusion that I do not see how in the world our Western allies or our friends in this hemisphere could fail to understand the absolute necessity for our action.

First, we must clearly formulate our plans to protect our shores and our interests, and then announce and declare these plans to our Western and Latin American allies sufficiently in advance for them to make the necessary and appropriate preparations and adjustments.

Our recent moves to bar aid to Cuba through a strangulation of the sea routes provide a substantial first step in the desired direction, including, first, the exclusion from U.S. ports of foreign ships transporting arms and other supplies to Cuba; second, the prohibition of any trade with Cuba for U.S. ships sailing under foreign registry, along with the similar prohibition for U.S. ships under domestic registry.

These steps gave notice to our allies that we were displeased with their failure to assist us voluntarily in freezing out the Communist threat in the Western Hemisphere via Cuba. Some of them—West Germany, Greece, Italy—heard our call. But others called it our

own local problem, as if Berlin were the common problem for all the Western allies while Cuba was our own private problem.

There are certain risks in following this course. But I say that the risks from inaction, from watching and waiting, are greater. Sooner or later we will be faced with an even more grave crisis in the Caribbean.

An effective plan for our own defense in the Caribbean will entail less cost and effort now than will be required when Castro has built up maximum strength with the aid of the Kremlin.

Back to Khrushchev's most recent step—the building of a port allegedly for the benefit of Russian fishing vessels. Close as Cuba is to our shore, including for example our missile testing base at Cape Canaveral, obviously any more moves of this sort holds in it the seeds of trouble for the United States.

Of course, the Panama Canal is not too far away.

That Castro's growing and cumulative military power is not immediately aided by this fishing port does not lessen the reality of his potential strength, nor does it lessen the continuing buildup serving as still another act of defiance to the United States and the entire Western Hemisphere.

Further, if we stand aside to allow Cuba's military preparations to continue without halt of substantial impediment, this will serve only as an encouragement for communistic probing and exploration at other trouble spots, Berlin or Formosa, for example.

Finally as our Latin American neighbors see Cuba in the ferment of unimpeded military preparation, they may well believe it the better part of valor to align themselves with Cuba. An unmistakable show of determination by the United States is necessary to counter these grave possibilities.

I say again, for emphasis, that this is my thought. This is my suggestion. This is a step which I think we should take in due course, after proper notice, as I have said, which would render unnecessary later the taking of far graver or more far-reaching steps of a similar or even more burdensome kind.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I am happy to yield to the Senator from Alabama, who is a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations, and who is well versed on this and kindred subjects.

Mr. SPARKMAN. First, I desire to say a word with reference to one comment that the very able Senator from Mississippi made about there being no debate on the Berlin concurrent resolution. The resolution was reported unanimously by the Foreign Relations Committee. It was brought before the Senate by unanimous consent. Unanimous consent was necessary, because the concurrent resolution was reported only today. One of the chief sponsors of the concurrent resolution in the Senate was the senior Senator from Oregon [Mr. Morse]. I asked the Senator from Oregon if he cared to make a statement. He said he did not. I made a very brief statement merely ex-

plaining what our action had been. I think it was generally felt that there was no need for debate. No Senator seemed to want to debate the resolution. However, complying perhaps with the implied suggestion of the Senator from Mississippi, I wish to say—

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the Senator will permit me, I should like to say that I am glad to have the Senator make his comments. His comments will be helpful for the Record. I was not opposing the resolution.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I understand that fully.

I agree with the Senator when he states that our commitments in Berlin have been stated over and over again. Some people may think that it is futile or useless to state our position again in the form in which it has now been stated. On the other hand, numerous Members of Congress of both Houses felt that it would be a good thing for the Congress to make a statement now in a concurrent resolution as to the sense of Congress.

In all frankness, I have never looked with a great deal of favor upon such resolutions. When the resolution relating to Formosa was before the Senate in 1953, I said on the floor of the Senate that the resolution was unnecessary. I stated that we had a treaty with Formosa that obligated us to do the things stated. It is within the discretion of the President to determine how such obligations are carried out.

Mr. STENNIS. I remember the argument of the Senator from Alabama on that very point.

Mr. SPARKMAN. When the Near East resolution came before the Senate, I took exactly the same attitude. Back in 1947, when the Greek-Turkish problem arose, the President of the United States did not call upon Congress for a resolution. He came to Congress with a message and said, "This is the foreign policy of the United States."

So far as I am concerned, the policy that was stated at that time by President Truman in relation to the Greek-Turkish problem is still the foreign policy of the United States. I felt that President Eisenhower would certainly be well within his rights in acting under that policy and making the same pronouncement.

I have somewhat the same feeling with reference to Cuba. I realize that Cuba is closer to home and that the problem is highly emotional. However, I voted for the Formosa resolution, the Near East resolution, and the Cuban resolution.

I had the same feeling about Berlin. First, as is stated in the preamble of our resolution, we have a responsibility under the Four Power Pact signed at the end of the war. Furthermore, President Truman, President Eisenhower, and President Kennedy have all pledged to the people of Berlin that we will do whatever is necessary in order to preserve the integrity of Berlin and the freedom of the people of Berlin. Of course, we will stand by that commitment.

However, someone is always ready to say that we will not stand fast in Ber-

lin. The Senator has heard that statement. He has seen it in newspapers and has read it in columns in different places around the country. Perhaps it would be a good thing for Congress to restate its position that we are going to stand firm.

I am as confident as I can be that the President of the United States, with or without the resolution, is determined to carry out our commitments to the people of Berlin and, furthermore, to the people in the Government of West Germany and to our allies in NATO and Western Europe.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. SPARKMAN. I yield.

Mr. STENNIS. I think it is very reassuring for the Senator to make a strong statement of that kind as to his belief. He represents the belief of all of us.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator from Mississippi knows that the Senator's remarks will strengthen the Record and the resolution.

Mr. SPARKMAN. If the Senator will yield, I should like to move into a discussion of the Cuban situation very briefly.

Mr. STENNIS. I am glad to yield.

Mr. SPARKMAN. The Cuban situation is naturally rather emotional because it is so close to home. Cuba is a part of our Western Hemisphere. It is a country which we liberated from a European power, and a country to which we gave much down through the years. It stings us to think of the present situation.

I have given a great deal of thought and attention to the Cuban situation. I have received a great amount of mail from my constituents and from others in different parts of the country regarding Cuba. I have tried to study the subject as best I could. I have attended conferences at the White House, and in the State Department. Secretary Rusk has appeared before the Foreign Relations Committee, of which I am a member. Representatives of the CIA have appeared before the committee. Secretary of Defense McNamara has been before the committee. There have been conferences with other military powers.

I wish to state a very few conclusions which I have reached.

First, I desire to make clear that I believe we have reliable sources of information on Cuba.

Second, I believe that the military has made very careful calculations on the military situation, strength, type, and so forth.

Third, I believe that there is a strong probability of obtaining unanimity of action on the part of the Western Hemisphere. Goodness knows, we need it. A great many of the people in Latin America still think of the gringos of the imperial north. When they think of intervention, they think of gunboat diplomacy. I do not lose patience with our Government when it tries to overcome those difficulties.

I think headway is being made to overcome them. The conference held in Washington only a week ago made considerable headway. I believe there will be unanimity of action. Steps have been taken.

I noticed the Senator's careful statement that steps should be taken in due course. I am glad he used the term "in due course," because I think, as the Good Book says, there is a time for all things.

One of the great mistakes we might make would be to do what some in our country—and not the Senator from Mississippi—have advocated, which is to rush in headlong and do something rash. As long as we can close the vise on the Castro regime, we will make headway.

I could relate a great many more of my thoughts regarding Russia's connections with Cuba and what she is going to be willing, able, and ready to do. But I believe the Cuban situation can be handled. It is being handled. The President has correct information as to what the situation is there. He is on the alert as to what needs to be done. I believe that those things are being done, to use the Senator's words, in due course.

There is one other thing that some of our people seem to overlook, that is the fact that while Cuba is close to home, it must not be considered as an isolated situation. There are many such bad spots throughout the world. We know from past performance that the Kremlin is able to press the button and produce trouble in any one of many spots around the world. I believe that Khrushchev clearly planned from the beginning to use Cuba as an irritant to the United States and still intends to do so. Nothing would please him more than to have us become so involved in Cuba that we might become indifferent with respect to Berlin.

Berlin is the great danger spot in the world. That is where world war III could break out. I believe that our Government is working on this problem diligently, and at the same time is keeping in mind the global aspects of the whole troublesome mess.

I followed the Senator very closely. I am in agreement with him that we must keep a tight hold on the situation. We must not let it get out of control. I do not believe that we will let it get out of control.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator for his comments. They are worthy of consideration, particularly, coming from him, a well-informed member of the Foreign Relations Committee.

I point out, in response to him, that I have talked with the CIA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and have heard testimony from the Secretary of State and others, and have talked with representatives of the Defense Department. I do so for myself. I talked with the Secretary of Defense and with many others over a period of more than a year. Something is being done. I do not say that the administration is indifferent in the slightest to this problem.

However, my point is that more drastic and more urgent and more positive steps are necessary before we can achieve needed results to stop this development.

I cannot believe that, with my knowledge of our great striking power, if we were to resist it, we would touch off some trouble in Berlin. I do not believe that Khrushchev would risk war with us over Cuba or over Berlin. Certainly we cannot let one buildup follow another, in Cuba, or Berlin, or Formosa. If we do, we will be nibbled away.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I do not believe the Senator meant to leave that impression.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I did not mean to do that at all. When I started I said that it seems to me that people sometimes thought of this as an isolated incident. We must work at the whole global job, and work hard. In that connection I wonder if the Senator has read a column—

Mr. STENNIS. Before the Senator leaves that point, I believe I should say that if we take positive action to protect ourselves in the Cuban area we will be furnishing to the world conclusive proof that we will take steps to protect ourselves in other areas.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes. We are taking that action. We are doing it, in the words of the Senator, "in due course." I wonder whether the Senator has read a column written by Walter Lippmann, which was placed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD yesterday by the Senator from Oregon [Mr. Morse]. It is found on page 22872 of the RECORD. I recommend its reading. It is a very thoughtful article dealing with this subject.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator. I shall read it. I have read many articles along this line, pro and con, but I have not read the article to which the Senator has referred.

I conclude by saying, with emphasis, that I hope the Senator from Alabama is correct in his expression as to what he called the strong probability of unity of action. Lack of unity of action is one of the things that disturbs the Senator from Mississippi. That is what has disturbed the Senator from Mississippi, as he has watched these developments week after week, month after month, and year after year. My proposed step would bring about unity of action in Latin American countries. It would bring about unanimity of action with respect to our allies elsewhere. This step or a similar step will be proof to the world and to our allies in particular that we will move in on this situation and do what is necessary, not precipitately, but in due course and in due time; and that does not mean at some remote time.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. STENNIS. I yield.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I have read an article printed in a New York paper, to the effect that Mr. Donovan, who is acting as the go-between in the negotiations for the release of the Cuban prisoners, is acting as an agent of the U.S. Government in those negotiations, and that a substantial part of the ransom money is being put up by our Government. I cannot conceive of that being true. However, I notice that the

story goes on to state that no official in the executive department has thus far denied it. I was wondering whether the Senator from Mississippi had any information on that subject and, if so, whether he wishes to say anything about it.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator from Mississippi is a member of the Appropriations Committee. Nothing like that has come before him in any hearings, and he has had no information with regard to it. I heard the subject mentioned on the radio, as a possibility. However, I have not been able to follow it up, because I have been busy with other matters, and have not had the opportunity to check on the radio report.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I hope it is an erroneous report.

Mr. STENNIS. I hope so, too.

Mr. WILLIAMS of Delaware. I trust it is an error and that our Government is not putting up a part of the ransom money. However, I feel that our Government has a responsibility to issue a denial of the statement, before it goes any further.

Mr. STENNIS. The Senator from Mississippi agrees. I would be very impatient with any proposal for our Government to pay a part of the ransom money out of the National Treasury. I thank the Senator for his contribution.

I close by emphasizing again that we hear a great deal of talk about what Russia is going to do with reference to Cuba. We know that one thing is certain, and that is that she will keep building up one thing after another so long as her hand is not called, and so long as there is no effective contest with respect to it. She will do that until some effective moves are made by us. It might not be necessary to do more than to start them. When those moves are made her efforts will be cut off and destroyed, whether it be in Berlin, Formosa, or elsewhere. In the opinion of the Senator from Mississippi it is much more likely that a great deal of the steam will be taken out of her efforts.

Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. HUMPHREY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### LOBBYING POWER OPERATES UNCHECKED IN WASHINGTON

Mr. PROXMIER. Mr. President, one of the most unfortunate, and neglected aspects of Government in Washington is the activity of lobbying and lobbyists. There is no question that lobbyists are very effective indeed, and there is no question that efforts looking toward their regulation are so ineffectual that they have become a farce.

An excellent series of articles is now being written by James McCartney, of the Washington bureau of the Chicago Daily News, an outstanding reporter.